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Abstract
Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed
system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories
in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permits
to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors.
We consider the well known problem of constructing a maximum metric tree in this context.
Combining these two properties is known to induce many impossibility results. In this paper,
we provide two necessary conditions to construct maximum metric tree in presence of transients
and (permanent) Byzantine faults.
1 Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of
faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [2,
3, 15] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults,
while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [11] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number
of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is
appealing yet proved difficult [4, 1, 14] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Related Works A promizing path towards multitolerance to both transient and Byzantine faults
is Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such
as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was
proposed [14, 13]. Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside
which the effect of permanent faults is masked, provided that the problem specification makes it
possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As many problems are not local, it
turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those. To circumvent impossibility
results, the weaker notion of strong stabilization was proposed [12, 7]: here, correct nodes outside
the containment radius may be perturbated by the actions of Byzantine node, but only a finite
number of times.
Recently, the idea of generalizing strict and strong stabilization to an area that depends on the
graph topology and the problem to be solved rather than an arbitrary fixed containment radius was
proposed [5, 6] and denoted by topology aware strict (and strong) stabilization. When maximizable
metric trees are considered, [5] proposed an optimal (with respect to impossibility results) protocol
for topology-aware strict stabilization, and for the simpler case of breath-first-search metric trees,
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[6] presented a protocol that is optimal both with respect to strict and strong variants of topology-
aware stabilization. The case of optimality for topology-aware strong stabilization in the general
maximal metric case remains open.
Our Contribution In this paper, we investigate the possibility of topology-aware strong sta-
bilization for tasks that are global (i.e. for with there exists a causality chain of size r, where
r depends on n the size of the network), and focus on the maximum metric tree problem. In
more details, we provide two necessary conditions to perform Byzantine containment for maximum
metric tree construction. First, we characterize a specific class of maximizable metrics (which
includes breath-first-search and shortest path metrics) that prevents the exitence of strong stabi-
lizing solutions. Then, we generalize an impossibilty result of [6] that provides a lower bound on
the containmemt area for topology-aware strong stabilization.
2 Model and Definitions
2.1 State Model
A distributed system S = (P,L) consists of a set P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} of processes and a set L
of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct
processes. A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is P and whose
link set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S. We use the following
notations: n = |P |, m = |L| and d(u, v) denotes the shortest path between two processes u and v
(i.e the length of the shortest path between u and v).
Processes u and v are called neighbors if (u, v) ∈ L. The set of neighbors of a process v is
denoted by Nv. We do not assume existence of a unique identifier for each process. Instead we
assume each process can distinguish its neighbors from each other by locally labelling them.
In this paper, we consider distributed systems of arbitrary topology. We assume that a single
process is distinguished as a root, and all the other processes are identical. We adopt the shared
state model as a communication model in this paper, where each process can directly read the
states of its neighbors.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. A process may take
actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an
atomic manner by the process. The action executed by each process is described by a finite set
of guarded actions of the form 〈guard〉 −→ 〈statement〉. Each guard of process u is a boolean
expression involving the variables of u and its neighbors.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product
of states of all processes. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed
system S. For a process set R ⊆ P and two configurations ρ and ρ′, we denote ρ
R
7→ ρ′ when ρ
changes to ρ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and ρ′
can be different only in the states of processes in R. For completeness of execution semantics, we
should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The
action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states of its neighbors at ρ, and the result
of the action reflects on the state of the process at ρ′.
We say that a process is enabled in a configuration ρ if the guard of at least one of its actions
is evaluated as true in ρ.
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R1, R2, . . .
be a schedule, where Ri ⊆ P holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations
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e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies
ρi−1
Ri
7→ ρi for each i (i ≥ 1). Process actions are executed atomically, and we distinguish some
properties on the scheduler (or daemon). A distributed daemon schedules the actions of processes
such that any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions. We say that the daemon
is central if it schedules action of only one process at any step. The set of all possible executions
from ρ0 ∈ C is denoted by Eρ0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by E, that is,
E =
⋃
ρ∈C Eρ. We consider asynchronous distributed systems where we can make no assumption
on schedules.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantine-
faulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine
process, v can repeatedly change its variables arbitrarily. For a given execution, the number of
faulty processes is arbitrary but we assume that the root process is never faulty.
2.2 Self-Stabilizing Protocols Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to
find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem,
while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification
predicate (shortly, specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with
a solution) if every process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on
variables of Pv (⊆ P ) where Pv is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The
variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables). In what
follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v).
A self-stabilizing protocol ([2]) is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration,
where spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a
legitimate configuration, every process never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec(v).
From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type
of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient
faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process cor-
rectly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently
faulty processes.
When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy spec(v). In
addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to
satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [14] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing
protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows.
Definition 1 (c-correct process) A process is c-correct if it is correct ( i.e. not Byzantine) and
located at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
Definition 2 ((c, f)-containment) A configuration ρ is (c, f)-contained for specification spec if,
given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from ρ, every c-correct process v
always satisfies spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [14]. The parameter
f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [14] dealt with unbounded number
of Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
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Definition 3 ((c, f)-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f)-strictly stabilizing for specification
spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . contains a configuration
ρi that is (c, f)-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [14] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. In-
tuitively, a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two
processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine
tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For
some (global) problems r can not be bounded by a constant. In consequence, we can show that
there exists no (c, 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for such a problem for any (finite) integer c.
Strong stabilization To circumvent such impossibility results, [7] defines a weaker notion than
the strict stabilization. Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. there may
exist processes outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to
Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered action is limited in times: the set of
Byzantine processes may only impact processes outside the containment radius a bounded number
of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
In the following of this section, we recall the formal definition of strong stabilization adopted in
[7]. From the states of c-correct processes, c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations
are defined as follows.
Definition 4 (c-legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is c-legitimate for spec if every
c-correct process v satisfies spec(v).
Definition 5 (c-stable configuration) A configuration ρ is c-stable if every c-correct process
never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed system even-
tually reaches a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a self-stabilizing system can be
disturbed by Byzantine processes after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The
c-disruption represents the period where c-correct processes are disturbed by Byzantine processes
and is defined as follows
Definition 6 (c-disruption) A portion of execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρt (t > 1) is a c-disruption if
and only if the following holds:
1. e is finite,
2. e contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable,
3. ρ0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable, and
4. ρt is the first configuration after ρ0 such that ρt is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable.
Now we can define a self-stabilizing protocol such that Byzantine processes may only impact
processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes
execute an infinite number of actions.
Definition 7 ((t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration) A configuration ρ0 is (t, k, c, f)-time
contained for spec if given at most f Byzantine processes, the following properties are satisfied:
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1. ρ0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable,
2. every execution starting from ρ0 contains a c-legitimate configuration for spec after which the
values of all the O-variables of c-correct processes remain unchanged (even when Byzantine
processes make actions repeatedly and forever),
3. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most t c-disruptions, and
4. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most k actions of changing the values of O-
variables for each c-correct process.
Definition 8 ((t, c, f)-strongly stabilizing protocol) A protocol A is (t, c, f)-strongly stabiliz-
ing if and only if starting from any arbitrary configuration, every execution involving at most f
Byzantine processes contains a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration that is reached after at most
l rounds. Parameters l and k are respectively the (t, c, f)-stabilization time and the (t, c, f)-process-
disruption times of A.
Note that a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration is a (c, f)-contained configuration when
t = k = 0, and thus, (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of
a (c, f)-contained configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing protocol is weaker than a strictly
stabilizing one (as processes outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to
Byzantine influence). However, a strongly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-
stabilizing one (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameters t, k and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do
not require each process to know the values of the parameters.
Topology-aware Byzantine resilience We saw previously that there exist a number of impos-
sibility results on strict stabilization due to the notion of r-restrictives specifications. To circumvent
this impossibility result, we describe here another weaker notion than the strict stabilization: the
topology-aware strict stabilization (denoted by TA strict stabilization for short) introduced by [5].
Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. the set of processes which may
be disturbed by Byzantine ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantine pro-
cesses (i.e. the set of processes at distance at most c from a Byzantine process) but can be defined
depending on the graph topology and Byzantine processes location.
In the following, we give formal definition of this new kind of Byzantine containment. From
now, B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and SB (which is function of B) denotes a subset of
V (intuitively, this set gathers all processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine processes).
Definition 9 (SB-correct node) A node is SB-correct if it is a correct node ( i.e. not Byzantine)
which not belongs to SB.
Definition 10 (SB-legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is SB-legitimate for spec if ev-
ery SB-correct node v is legitimate for spec ( i.e. if spec(v) holds).
Definition 11 ((SB, f)-topology-aware containment) A configuration ρ0 is (SB , f)-topology-
aware contained for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . ., every configuration is SB-legitimate and every SB-correct process never changes its
O-variables.
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The parameter SB of Definition 11 refers to the containment area. Any process which belongs
to this set may be infinitely disturbed by Byzantine processes. The parameter f refers explicitly
to the number of Byzantine processes.
Definition 12 ((SB, f)-topology-aware strict stabilization) A protocol is (SB , f)-topology-
aware strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . contains a configuration ρi that is (SB , f)-topology-aware contained for spec.
Note that, if B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and SB =
{
v ∈ V |min
b∈B
(d(v, b)) ≤ c
}
,
then a (SB , f)-topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is a (c, f)-strictly stabilizing protocol.
Then, the concept of topology-aware strict stabilization is a generalization of the strict stabilization.
However, note that a TA strictly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing
protocol (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes). The
parameter SB is introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each
process to know the actual definition of the set.
Similarly to topology-aware strict stabilization, we can weaken the notion of strong stabilization
using the notion of containment area. This idea was introduced by [6]. We recall in the following
the formal definition of this concept.
Definition 13 (SB-stable configuration) A configuration ρ is SB-stable if every SB-correct pro-
cess never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Definition 14 (SB-TA-disruption) A portion of execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρt (t > 1) is a SB-
TA-disruption if and only if the followings hold:
1. e is finite,
2. e contains at least one action of a SB-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable,
3. ρ0 is SB-legitimate for spec and SB-stable, and
4. ρt is the first configuration after ρ0 such that ρt is SB-legitimate for spec and SB-stable.
Definition 15 ((t, k, SB , f)-TA time contained configuration) A configuration ρ0 is (t, k, SB ,
f)-TA time contained for spec if given at most f Byzantine processes, the following properties are
satisfied:
1. ρ0 is SB-legitimate for spec and SB-stable,
2. every execution starting from ρ0 contains a SB-legitimate configuration for spec after which
the values of all the O-variables of SB-correct processes remain unchanged (even when Byzan-
tine processes make actions repeatedly and forever),
3. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most t SB-TA-disruptions, and
4. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most k actions of changing the values of O-
variables for each SB-correct process.
Definition 16 ((t, SB, f)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol) A protocol A is (t, SB , f)-TA
strongly stabilizing if and only if starting from any arbitrary configuration, every execution involv-
ing at most f Byzantine processes contains a (t, k, SB , f)-TA-time contained configuration that is
reached after at most l actions of each SB-correct node. Parameters l and k are respectively the
(t, SB , f)-stabilization time and the (t, SB , f)-process-disruption time of A.
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3 Maximum Metric Tree Construction
3.1 Definition and Specification
In this work, we deal with maximum (routing) metric trees as defined in [9]. Informally, the goal
of a routing protocol is to construct a tree that simultaneously maximizes the metric values of all
of the nodes with respect to some total ordering ≺. In the following, we recall all definitions and
notations introduced in [9].
Definition 17 (Routing metric) A routing metric (or just metric) is a five-tuple (M,W,met,mr,
≺) where:
1. M is a set of metric values,
2. W is a set of edge weights,
3. met is a metric function whose domain is M ×W and whose range is M ,
4. mr is the maximum metric value in M with respect to ≺ and is assigned to the root of the
system,
5. ≺ is a less-than total order relation over M that satisfies the following three conditions for
arbitrary metric values m, m′, and m′′ in M :
(a) irreflexivity: m 6≺ m,
(b) transitivity : if m ≺ m′ and m′ ≺ m′′ then m ≺ m′′,
(c) totality: m ≺ m′ or m′ ≺ m or m = m′.
Any metric value m ∈M \ {mr} satisfies the utility condition (that is, there exist w0, . . . , wk−1 in
W and m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk = m in M such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1)).
For instance, we provide the definition of four classical metrics with this model: the shortest
path metric (SP), the flow metric (F), and the reliability metric (R). Note also that we can
modelise the construction of a spanning tree with no particular constraints in this model using the
metric NC described below and the construction of a BFS spanning tree using the shortest path
metric (SP) with W1 = {1} (we denoted this metric by BFS in the following).
SP = (M1,W1,met1,mr1,≺1) F = (M2,W2,met2,mr2,≺2)
where M1 = N where mr2 ∈ N
W1 = N M2 = {0, . . . ,mr2}
met1(m,w) = m+ w W2 = {0, . . . ,mr2}
mr1 = 0 met2(m,w) = min{m,w}
≺1 is the classical > relation ≺2 is the classical < relation
R = (M3,W3,met3,mr3,≺3) NC = (M4,W4,met4,mr4,≺4)
where M3 = [0, 1] where M4 = {0}
W3 = [0, 1] W4 = {0}
met3(m,w) = m ∗ w met4(m,w) = 0
mr3 = 1 mr4 = 0
≺3 is the classical < relation ≺4 is the classical < relation
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Definition 18 (Assigned metric) An assigned metric over a system S is a six-tuple (M,W,met,
mr,≺, wf) where (M,W,met,mr,≺) is a metric and wf is a function that assigns to each edge of
S a weight in W .
Let a rooted path (from v) be a simple path from a process v to the root r. The next set of
definitions are with respect to an assigned metric (M,W,met,mr,≺, wf) over a given system S.
Definition 19 (Metric of a rooted path) The metric of a rooted path in S is the prefix sum
of met over the edge weights in the path and mr.
For example, if a rooted path p in S is vk, . . . , v0 with v0 = r, then the metric of p is mk =
met(mk−1, wf({vk, vk−1}) with ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},mi = met(mi−1, wf({vi, vi−1}) and m0 = mr.
Definition 20 (Maximum metric path) A rooted path p from v in S is called a maximum
metric path with respect to an assigned metric if and only if for every other rooted path q from v
in S, the metric of p is greater than or equal to the metric of q with respect to the total order ≺.
Definition 21 (Maximum metric of a node) The maximum metric of a node v 6= r (or simply
metric value of v) in S is defined by the metric of a maximum metric path from v. The maximum
metric of r is mr.
Definition 22 (Maximum metric tree) A spanning tree T of S is a maximum metric tree with
respect to an assigned metric over S if and only if every rooted path in T is a maximum metric
path in S with respect to the assigned metric.
The goal of the work of [9] is the study of metrics that always allow the construction of a
maximum metric tree. More formally, the definition follows.
Definition 23 (Maximizable metric) A metric is maximizable if and only if for any assign-
ment of this metric over any system S, there is a maximum metric tree for S with respect to the
assigned metric.
Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), the aim of this work is to study the
construction of a maximum metric tree with respect to M which spans the system in a self-
stabilizing way in a system subject to permanent Byzantine failures. It is obvious that these
Byzantine processes may disturb some correct processes. It is why, we relax the problem in the
following way: we want to construct a maximum metric forest with respect to M. The root of any
tree of this forest must be either the real root or a Byzantine process.
Each process v has two O-variables: a pointer to its parent in its tree (prntv ∈ Nv ∪{⊥}) and a
level which stores its current metric value (levelv ∈M). Obviously, Byzantine process may disturb
(at least) their neighbors. We use the following specification of the problem.
We introduce new notations as follows. Given an assigned metric (M,W,met,mr,≺, wf) over
the system S and two processes u and v, we denote by µ(u, v) the maximum metric of node u when
v plays the role of the root of the system. If u and v are neighbors, we denote by wu,v the weight
of the edge {u, v} (that is, the value of wf({u, v})).
Definition 24 (M-path) Given an assigned metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺, wf) over a system
S, a path (v0, . . . , vk) (k ≥ 1) of S is a M-path if and only if:
1. prntv0 = ⊥, levelv0 = 0, and v0 ∈ B ∪ {r},
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2. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, prntvi = vi−1 and levelvi = met(levelvi−1 , wvi,vi−1),
3. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},met(levelvi−1 , wvi,vi−1) = max≺
u∈Nv
{met(levelu, wvi,u)}, and
4. levelvk = µ(vk, v0).
We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the maximum metric tree construction with
respect to a maximizable metric M as follows.
spec(v) :
{
prntv = ⊥ and levelv = 0 if v is the root r
there exists a M-path (v0, . . . , vk) such that vk = v otherwise
3.2 Previous results
In this section, we summarize known results about maximum metric tree construction. The first
interesting result about maximizable metrics is due to [9] that provides a fully characterization of
maximizable metrics as follow.
Definition 25 (Boundedness) A metric (M,W,met,mr,≺) is bounded if and only if: ∀m ∈
M,∀w ∈W,met(m,w) ≺ m or met(m,w) = m
Definition 26 (Monotonicity) A metric (M,W,met,mr,≺) is monotonic if and only if: ∀(m,
m′) ∈M2,∀w ∈W,m ≺ m′ ⇒ (met(m,w) ≺ met(m′, w) or met(m,w) = met(m′, w))
Theorem 1 (Characterization of maximizable metrics [9]) A metric is maximizable if and
only if this metric is bounded and monotonic.
Secondly, [8] provides a self-stabilizing protocol to construct a maximum metric tree with respect
to any maximizable metric. Now, we focus on self-stabilizating solutions resilient to Byzantine
faults. Following discussion of Section 2, it is obvious that there exists no strictly stabilizing
protocol for this problem. If we consider the weaker notion of topology-aware strict stabilization,
[5] defines the best containment area as:
SB = {v ∈ V \B |µ(v, r)  max≺{µ(v, b), b ∈ B}} \ {r}
Intuitively, SB gathers correct processes that are closer (or at equal distance) from a Byzantine
process than the root according to the metric. Moreover, [5] proves that the algorithm introduced
for the maximum metric spanning tree construction in [8] performed this optimal containment area.
More formally, [5] proves the following results.
Theorem 2 ([5]) Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), even under the central
daemon, there exists no (AB , 1)-TA-strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree
construction with respect to M where AB  SB.
Theorem 3 ([5]) Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), the protocol of [8] is a
(SB , n − 1)-TA strictly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with
respect to M.
Some others works try to circumvent the impossibility result of strict stabilization using the
concept ot strong stabilization but do not provide results for any maximizable metric. Indeed, [7]
proves the following result about spanning tree.
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Theorem 4 ([7]) There exists a (t, 0, n−1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric span-
ning tree construction with respect to NC (that is, for a spanning tree with no particular constraints)
with a finite t.
On the other hand, regarding BFS spanning tree construction, [6] proved the following impos-
sibility result.
Theorem 5 ([6]) Even under the central daemon, there exists no (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing pro-
tocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where t and c are two
finite integers.
These two results motivate our result related to strong stabilization in the general case (see Sec-
tion 4.1) that proves a necessary condition on the maximizable metric to allow strong stabilization.
Now, if we focus on topology-aware strong stabilization, [6] proved the following results.
Theorem 6 ([6]) Even under the central daemon, there exists no (t, A∗B , 1)-TA strongly stabilizing
protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where A∗B  {v ∈
V |min
b∈B
(d(v, b)) < d(r, v)} and t is a finite integer.
Theorem 7 ([6]) The protocol of [10] is a (t, S∗B , n− 1)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol for max-
imum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where t is a finite integer and S∗B =
{v ∈ V |min
b∈B
(d(v, b)) < d(r, v)}.
In the following, we generalize the Theorem 6 to any maximizable metric (see Section 4.2).
4 Necessary conditions
In this section, we provide our necessary conditions about containment radius (respectively area)
of any strongly stabilizing (respectively TA strongly stabilizing) protocol for the maximum metric
tree construction.
4.1 Strong Stabilization
We introduce here some new definitions to characterize some important properties of maximizable
metrics that are used in the following.
Definition 27 (Strictly decreasing metric) A metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) is strictly de-
creasing if, for any metric value m ∈M , the following property holds: either ∀w ∈W,met(m,w) ≺
m or ∀w ∈W,met(m,w) = m.
Definition 28 (Fixed point) A metric valuem is a fixed point of a metricM = (M,W,mr,met,≺
) if m ∈M and if for any value w ∈W , we have: met(m,w) = m.
Then, we define a specific class of maximizable metrics and we prove that it is possible to
construct a maximum metric tree in a strongly-stabilizing way only if we consider such a metric.
Definition 29 (Strongly maximizable metric) A maximizable metricM = (M,W,mr,met,≺
) is strongly maximizable if and only if |M | = 1 or if the following properties holds:
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• |M | ≥ 2,
• M is strictly decreasing, and
• M has one and only one fixed point.
Note that NC is a strongly maximizable metric (since |M4| = 1) whereas BFS or SP are not
(since the first one has no fixed point, the second is not strictly decreasing). If we consider the
metric MET defined below, we can show that MET is a strongly maximizable metric such that
|M | ≥ 2.
MET = (M5,W5,met5,mr5,≺5)
where M5 = {0, 1, 2, 3}
W5 = {1}
met5(m,w) = max{0,m −w}
mr5 = 3
≺5 is the classical < relation
Now, we can state our first necessary condition.
Theorem 8 Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), even under the central dae-
mon, there exists no (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree con-
struction with respect to M for any finite integer t if:

M is not a strongly maximizable metric
or
c < |M | − 2
Proof We prove this result by contradiction. We assume so that M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) is a
maximizable metric such that there exist a finite integer t and a protocol P that is a (t, c, 1)-
strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to M.
We distinguish the following cases (note that they are exhaustive):
Case 1: M is a strongly maximizing metric and c < |M | − 2.
As c ≥ 0, we know that |M | ≥ 2 and by definition of a strongly stabilizing metric, M is
strictly decreasing, and M has one and only one fixed point.
By assumption onM, we know that there exist c+3 distinct metric values m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,
mc+2 inM and w0, w1, . . . , wc+1 inW such that: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c+2},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1) ≺
mi−1.
Let S = (V,E,W) be the following weighted system V = {p0 = r, p1, . . . , p2c+2, p2c+3 = b},
E = {{pi, pi+1}, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c+2}} and ∀i ∈ {0, c+1}, wpi,pi+1 = wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i = wi. Note
that the choice wpc+1,pc+2 = wc+1 ensures us the following property when levelr = levelb =
mr: µ(pc+1, b) ≺ µ(pc+1, r) (and by symmetry, µ(pc+2, r) ≺ µ(pc+2, b)). Process p0 is the
real root and process b is a Byzantine one. Note that the construction of W ensures the
following properties when levelr = levelb = mr: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 1}, µ(pi, r) = µ(p2c+3−i, b),
µ(pi, b) ≺ µ(pi, r) and µ(p2c+3−i, r) ≺ µ(p2c+3−i, b).
Assume that the initial configuration ρ0 of S satisfies: prntr = prntb = ⊥, levelr = levelb =
mr, and other variables of b (if any) are identical to those of r (see Figure 1, variables of other
processes may be arbitrary). Assume now that b takes exactly the same actions as r (if any)
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Figure 1: Configurations used in proof of Theorem 8, case 1.
immediately after r. Then, by symmetry of the execution and by convergence of P to spec, we
can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ1 (see Figure 1) in which:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c+1}, prntpi = pi−1, levelpi = µ(pi, r) = mi and ∀i ∈ {c+2, . . . , 2c+2}, prntpi =
pi+1 and levelpi = µ(pi, b) = m2c+3−i (because this configuration is the only one in which
all correct process v satisfies spec(v) when prntr = prntb = ⊥ and levelr = levelb = mr by
construction of W). Note that ρ1 is c-legitimate and c-stable.
Assume now that the Byzantine process acts as a correct process and executes correctly
its algorithm. Then, by convergence of P in fault-free systems (remember that a strongly-
stabilizing algorithm is a special case of self-stabilizing algorithm), we can deduce that the
system reach in a finite time a configuration ρ2 (see Figure 1) in which: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2c +
3}, prntpi = pi−1 and levelpi = µ(pi, r) (because this configuration is the only one in which all
process v satisfies spec(v)). Note that the portion of execution between ρ1 and ρ2 contains at
least one c-perturbation (pc+2 is a c-correct process and modifies at least once its O-variables)
and that ρ2 is c-legitimate and c-stable.
Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: prntb = ⊥ and levelb =
mr. This step brings the system into configuration ρ3 (see Figure 1). From this configuration,
we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ0. By the same token, we obtain an
execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see ρ1) and an infinite
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Figure 2: Configurations used in proof of Theorem 8, cases 2 and 3.
number of c-perturbation which contradicts the (t, c, 1)-strong stabilization of P.
Case 2: M is not strictly decreasing.
By definition, we know thatM is not a strongly maximizable metric. Hence, we have |M | ≥ 2.
Then, the definition of a strictly decreasing metric implies that there exists a metric value
m ∈ M such that: ∃w ∈ W, met(m,w) = m and ∃w′ ∈ W,m′ = met(m,w′) ≺ m (and thus
m is not a fixed point of M). By the utility condition on M , we know that there exists a
sequence of metric values m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,ml = m in M and w0, w1, . . . , wl−1 in W such
that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1). Denote by k the length of the shortest such
sequence. Note that this implies that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},mi ≺ mi−1 (otherwise we can remove
mi from the sequence and this is contradictory with the construction of k). We distinguish
the following cases:
Case 2.1: k ≥ c+ 2.
We can use the same token as case 1 above by using w′ instead of wc+1 in the case where
k = c+ 2 (since we know that met(m,w′) ≺ m).
Case 2.2: k < c+ 2.
Let S1 = (V,E,W) be the following weighted system V = {p0 = r, p1, . . . , p2c+2, p2c+3 =
b}, E = {{pi, pi+1}, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c+ 2}}, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, wpi,pi+1 = wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i =
wi, ∀i ∈ {k, . . . , c}, wpi,pi+1 = wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i = w and wpc+1,pc+2 = w
′ (see Figure 2).
Note that this choice ensures us the following property when levelr = levelb = mr:
µ(pc+1, b) ≺ µ(pc+1, r) (and by symmetry, µ(pc+2, r) ≺ µ(pc+2, b)). Process p0 is the
real root and process b is a Byzantine one. Note that the construction of W ensures
the following properties when levelr = levelb = mr: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 1}, µ(pi, r) =
µ(p2c+3−i, b), µ(pi, b) ≺ µ(pi, r) and µ(p2c+3−i, r) ≺ µ(p2c+3−i, b).
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This construction allows us to follow the same proof as in case 1 above.
Case 3: M has no or more than two fixed point, and is strictly decreasing.
If M has no fixed point and is strictly decreasing, then |M | is not finite and then, we can
apply the result of case 1 above since c is a finite integer.
If M has two or more fixed points and is strictly decreasing, denote by Υ and Υ′ two fixed
points of M. Without loss of generality, assume that Υ ≺ Υ′. By the utility condition on
M , we know that there exists sequences of metric values m0 = mr,m1, . . . ,ml = Υ and
m′0 = mr,m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
l′ = Υ
′ in M and w0, w1, . . . , wl−1 and w
′
0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
l′−1 in W such
that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l},mi = met(mi−1, wi−1) and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l
′},m′i = met(m
′
i−1, w
′
i−1).
Denote by k and k′ the length of shortest such sequences. Note that this implies that
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k},mi ≺ mi−1 and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k
′},m′i ≺ m
′
i−1 (otherwise we can remove mi or
m′i from the corresponding sequence). We distinguish the following cases:
Case 3.1: k > c+ 2 or k′ > c+ 2.
Without loss of generality, assume that k > c + 2 (the second case is similar). We can
use the same token as case 1 above.
Case 3.2: k ≤ c+ 2 and k′ ≤ c+ 2.
Let w be an arbitrary value of W . Let S2 = (V,E,W) be the following weighted
system V = {p0 = r, p1, . . . , p2c+2, p2c+3 = b}, E = {{pi, pi+1}, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c + 2}},
∀i ∈ {0, k − 1}, wpi,pi+1 = wi, ∀i ∈ {0, k
′ − 1}, wp2c+3−i,p2c+2−i = w
′
i and ∀i ∈ {k, 2c+ 2−
k′}, wpi,pi+1 = w (see Figure 2). Note that this choice ensures us the following property
when levelr = levelb = mr: µ(pc+1, r) = Υ ≺ Υ
′ = µ(pc+1, b) and µ(pc+2, r) = Υ ≺
Υ′ = µ(pc+2, b). Process p0 is the real root and process b is a Byzantine one.
This construction allows us to follow a similar proof as in case 1 above (note that any
process u which satisfies µ(u, r) ≺ Υ′ will be disturb infinitely often, in particular at
least pc+1 and pc+2 which contradicts the (t, c, 1)-strong stabilization of P).
In any case, we show that there exists a system which contradicts the (t, c, 1)-strong stabilization
of P that ends the proof. 
4.2 Topology Aware Strong Stabilization
First, we generalize the set S∗B previously defined for the BFS metric in [6] to any maximizable
metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺).
S∗B =
{
v ∈ V \B
∣∣∣∣µ(v, r) ≺ max≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)}
}
Intuitively, S∗B gathers the set of corrects processes that are strictly closer (according to M)
to a Byzantine process than the root. Figures from 3 to 5 provide some examples of containment
areas with respect to several maximizable metrics and compare it to SB, the optimal containment
area for TA strict stabilization.
Now, we can state our generalization of Theorem 6.
Theorem 9 Given a maximizable metric M = (M,W,mr,met,≺), even under the central dae-
mon, there exists no (t, A∗B , 1)-TA-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree
construction with respect to M where A∗B  S
∗
B and t is a given finite integer.
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Figure 3: Examples of containment areas for SP spanning tree construction.
Proof Let M = (M,W,mr,met,≺) be a maximizable metric and P be a (t, A∗B , 1)-TA-strongly
stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction protocol with respect to M
where A∗B  S
∗
B and t is a finite integer. We must distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: |M | = 1.
Denote by m the metric value such that M = {m}. For any system and for any process v, we
have µ(v, r) = min≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)} = m. Consequently, S∗B = ∅ for any system. Then, it is absurd
to have A∗B  S
∗
B.
Case 2: |M | ≥ 2.
By definition of a bounded metric, we can deduce that there exists m ∈M and w ∈W such
that m = met(mr,w) ≺ mr. Then, we must distinguish the following cases:
Case 2.1: m is a fixed point of M.
Let S be a system such that any edge incident to the root or a Byzantine process has a
weight equals to w. Then, we can deduce that we have: m = max≺
b∈B
{µ(r, b)} ≺ µ(r, r) =
mr and for any correct process v 6= r, µ(v, r) = max≺
b∈B
{µ(v, b)} = m. Hence, S∗B = ∅ for
any such system. Then, it is absurd to have A∗B  S
∗
B .
Case 2.2: m is not a fixed point of M.
This implies that there exists w′ ∈ W such that: met(m,w′) ≺ m (remember that M
is bounded). Consider the following system: V = {r, u, u′, v, v′, b}, E = {{r, u}, {r, u′},
{u, v}, {u′, v′}, {v, b}, {v′ , b}}, wr,u = wr,u′ = wv,b = wv′,b = w, and wu,v = wu′,v′ = w
′
(b is a Byzantine process). We can see that S∗B = {v, v
′}. Since A∗B  SB, we have:
v /∈ A∗B or v
′ /∈ A∗B . Consider now the following configuration ρ0: prntr = prntb = ⊥,
levelr = levelb = mr, and prnt, level variables of other processes are arbitrary (see
Figure 6, other variables may have arbitrary values but other variables of b are identical
to those of r).
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Figure 4: Examples of containment areas for flow spanning tree construction.
Assume now that b takes exactly the same actions as r (if any) immediately after r
(note that r /∈ A∗B and hence prntr = ⊥ and levelr = mr still hold by closure and then
prntb = ⊥ and levelb = mr still hold too). Then, by symmetry of the execution and
by convergence of P to spec, we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time
a configuration ρ1 (see Figure 6) in which: prntr = prntb = ⊥, prntu = prntu′ = r,
prntv = prntv′ = b, levelr = levelb = mr, and levelu = levelu′ = levelv = levelv′ = m
(because this configuration is the only one in which all correct process v satisfies spec(v)
when prntr = prntb = ⊥ and levelr = levelb = mr since met(m,w
′) ≺ m). Note that ρ1
is A∗B-legitimate for spec and A
∗
B-stable (whatever A
∗
B is).
Assume now that b behaves as a correct processor with respect to P. Then, by con-
vergence of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ1 which is not legitimate (remember
that a TA-strongly stabilizing algorithm is a special case of self-stabilizing algorithm),
we can deduce that the system reach in a finite time a configuration ρ2 (see Figure 6)
in which: prntr = ⊥, prntu = prntu′ = r, prntv = u, prntv′ = u
′, prntb = v (or
prntb = v
′), levelr = mr, levelu = levelu′ = m levelv = levelv′ = met(m,w
′) = m′,
and levelb = met(m
′, w) = m′′. Note that processes v and v′ modify their O-variables
in the portion of execution between ρ1 and ρ2 and that ρ2 is A
∗
B-legitimate for spec and
A∗B-stable (whatever A
∗
B is). Consequently, this portion of execution contains at least
one A∗B-TA-disruption (whatever A
∗
B is).
Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: prntb = ⊥ and
levelb = mr. This step brings the system into configuration ρ3 (see Figure 6). From this
configuration, we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ0. By the same token,
we obtain an execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see
ρ1) and an infinite number of A
∗
B-TA-disruption (whatever A
∗
B is) which contradicts the
(t, A∗B , 1)-TA-strong stabilization of P.

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Figure 5: Examples of containment areas for reliability spanning tree construction.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two necessary conditions to achieve strong stabilization and topology-
aware strong stabilization in maximum metric tree construction. Our work obviously leads to
the following open question: is there a topology-aware strongly stabilizing protocol that ensures a
containmemt area equal to S∗B? We conjecture that it is the case.
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